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Gj\u00ebja m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme me t\u00eb cil\u00ebn presidenti rus Putin p\u00ebrpiqet t’u l\u00ebr\u00eb p\u00ebrshtypje miqve per\u00ebndimor\u00eb t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb se ai ka koh\u00eb n\u00eb an\u00ebn e tij, k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb e vetmja m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr t’i dh\u00ebn\u00eb fund luft\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb plot\u00ebsoj\u00eb d\u00ebshirat e tij. Elasticiteti i duksh\u00ebm i ekonomis\u00eb s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb dhe skepticizmi q\u00eb rezulton n\u00eb disa qoshe se sanksionet per\u00ebndimore kan\u00eb pasur pak efekt, \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb qendrore e k\u00ebsaj lufte informacioni.<\/span><\/p>\n E v\u00ebrteta \u00ebsht\u00eb se bazat financiare t\u00eb ekonomis\u00eb ruse t\u00eb luft\u00ebs duken gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb zymta, aq shum\u00eb sa an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e lart\u00eb t\u00eb elit\u00ebs qeveris\u00ebse po shprehin publikisht shqet\u00ebsimin. Ato p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb Sergei Chemezovin, shefin ekzekutiv t\u00eb gjigantit shtet\u00ebror t\u00eb mbrojtjes Rostec, i cili paralajm\u00ebroi se kredit\u00eb e shtrenjta po vrisnin biznesin e tij t\u00eb eksportit t\u00eb arm\u00ebve dhe Elvira Nabiullinan, shefe e Bank\u00ebs Qendrore.<\/span><\/p>\n Dyshja e di m\u00eb mir\u00eb se shum\u00eb njer\u00ebz n\u00eb per\u00ebndim, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt jan\u00eb mashtruar me shifrat q\u00eb tregojn\u00eb rritje t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme, papun\u00ebsi t\u00eb ul\u00ebt dhe rritje t\u00eb pagave. Por \u00e7do ekonomi n\u00eb nj\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb plot\u00eb mobilizimi mund t\u00eb prodhoj\u00eb rezultate t\u00eb tilla: ky \u00ebsht\u00eb kejnsianizmi baz\u00eb. Prova e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb se si burimet e p\u00ebrdorura tashm\u00eb – n\u00eb vend t\u00eb atyre boshe – po zhvendosen nga p\u00ebrdorimet e tyre t\u00eb m\u00ebparshme dhe po zhvendosen n\u00eb nevojat e luft\u00ebs.<\/span><\/p>\n Nj\u00eb shtet ka tre m\u00ebnyra p\u00ebr ta arritur k\u00ebt\u00eb: huamarrje, inflacion dhe shpron\u00ebsim. Duhet t\u00eb zgjedh\u00eb p\u00ebrzierjen m\u00eb efektive dhe pa dhimbje. Bindja e Putinit – si ndaj per\u00ebndimit ashtu edhe ndaj publikut t\u00eb tij – ka qen\u00eb se ai mund ta financoj\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb luft\u00eb pa paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebri financiare apo sakrifica t\u00eb konsiderueshme materiale. Por ky \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb iluzion. N\u00ebse zhg\u00ebnjimet e Chemezovit dhe Nabiullinas po p\u00ebrhapen n\u00eb opinionin publik, kjo do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se iluzioni po dridhet.<\/span><\/p>\n Nj\u00eb raport i ri nga analisti rus dhe ish-bankieri Craig Kennedy thekson rritjen e madhe t\u00eb borxhit t\u00eb korporatave ruse. Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb rritur me 71 p\u00ebr qind q\u00eb nga viti 2022 dhe zvog\u00eblon huamarrjen e familjeve t\u00eb reja dhe t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n N\u00eb kuptimin privat, kjo huadh\u00ebnie \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb nj\u00eb krijes\u00eb e shtetit. Putini ka komanduar sistemin bankar rus, me bankat q\u00eb u k\u00ebrkohet t’u japin hua kompanive t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuara nga qeveria me kushte t\u00eb zgjedhura, preferenciale. Rezultati ka qen\u00eb nj\u00eb v\u00ebrshim i kredive n\u00ebn norm\u00ebn e tregut p\u00ebr aktor\u00ebt e favorizuar ekonomik\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n N\u00eb thelb, Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb e angazhuar n\u00eb shtypjen masive t\u00eb parave, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mos shfaqen n\u00eb bilancet publike. Kennedy vler\u00ebson totalin n\u00eb rreth 20 p\u00ebr qind t\u00eb prodhimit komb\u00ebtar t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr vitin 2023, i krahasuesh\u00ebm me alokimet kumulative t\u00eb buxhetit p\u00ebr luft\u00ebn n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb plot\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n Nga veprimet e Kremlinit mund t\u00eb thuhet se ai i sheh dy gj\u00ebra si anatem\u00eb: financat publike duksh\u00ebm t\u00eb dob\u00ebta dhe inflacioni i arratisur.<\/span><\/p>\n Qeveria i shmanget nj\u00eb deficiti t\u00eb konsideruesh\u00ebm buxhetor, pavar\u00ebsisht rritjes s\u00eb shpenzimeve t\u00eb lidhura me luft\u00ebn. Banka qendrore mbetet e lir\u00eb t\u00eb rris\u00eb normat e interesit, aktualisht n\u00eb 21 p\u00ebr qind. Jo mjaftuesh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb mposhtur inflacionin e nxitur nga kredia e subvencionuar e dekretuar nga shteti, por mjafton p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbajtur rritjen e \u00e7mimeve brenda kufijve.<\/span><\/p>\n Rezultati \u00ebsht\u00eb se problemet e Chemezovit dhe Nabiullinas nuk jan\u00eb nj\u00eb gabim q\u00eb mund t\u00eb rregullohet, por i natyrsh\u00ebm i zgjedhjes s\u00eb Putinit p\u00ebr t\u00eb lajkatur financat publike dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbajtur nj\u00eb kapak (t\u00eb lart\u00eb) ndaj inflacionit. Di\u00e7ka tjet\u00ebr duhet t\u00eb jap\u00eb dhe ajo di\u00e7ka tjet\u00ebr p\u00ebrfshin bizneset q\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb operojn\u00eb me fitim kur kostot e huamarrjes kalojn\u00eb 20 p\u00ebr qind.<\/span><\/p>\n Skema e privatizuar e kreditit t\u00eb Putinit, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb, po ruan nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb kredie pasi kredit\u00eb shkojn\u00eb keq. Shteti mund t\u00eb shp\u00ebtoj\u00eb bankat – n\u00ebse ato nuk falimentojn\u00eb s\u00eb pari. Duke pasur parasysh p\u00ebrvoj\u00ebn e rus\u00ebve nga humbja e parave, frika e nj\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebritjeje t\u00eb till\u00eb mund t\u00eb shkaktoj\u00eb leht\u00ebsisht kaos. Kjo do t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrronte jo vet\u00ebm legjitimitetin e bankave, por edhe t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n Putini, me pak fjal\u00eb, nuk e ka koh\u00eb n\u00eb an\u00ebn e tij. Ai \u00ebsht\u00eb ulur mbi nj\u00eb bomb\u00eb me sahat financiare t\u00eb krijuar nga vet\u00eb ai. \u00c7el\u00ebsi p\u00ebr miqt\u00eb e Ukrain\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb t’i mohojn\u00eb atij t\u00eb vetmen gj\u00eb q\u00eb do ta qet\u00ebsonte at\u00eb: qasjen m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb fondet e jashtme.<\/span><\/p>\n Per\u00ebndimi ka bllokuar qasjen e Mosk\u00ebs n\u00eb rreth 300 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb rezerva, ka v\u00ebn\u00eb pengesa tregtin\u00eb e naft\u00ebs dhe ka goditur aft\u00ebsin\u00eb e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb importuar nj\u00eb s\u00ebr\u00eb mallrash. T\u00eb kombinuara, k\u00ebto pengojn\u00eb Rusin\u00eb t\u00eb shpenzoj\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha t\u00eb ardhurat e saj t\u00eb huaja p\u00ebr t\u00eb leht\u00ebsuar kufizimet e burimeve n\u00eb vend. Shtimi i sanksioneve dhe s\u00eb fundi transferimi i rezervave n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb si paradh\u00ebnie p\u00ebr reparacionet do t\u00eb intensifikonte k\u00ebto kufizime.<\/span><\/p>\n Obsesioni i Putinit \u00ebsht\u00eb kolapsi i papritur i pushtetit. Ky \u00ebsht\u00eb rreziku q\u00eb ekonomia e tij e luft\u00ebs ka v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb l\u00ebvizje. Qasja n\u00eb burimet e jashtme n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet leht\u00ebsimit t\u00eb sanksioneve, do jet\u00eb q\u00ebllimi i tij n\u00eb \u00e7do negociat\u00eb. Per\u00ebndimi duhet ta bind\u00eb se kjo nuk do t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb. Kjo, dhe vet\u00ebm kaq, do e detyroj\u00eb Putinin t\u00eb zgjedh\u00eb midis sulmit t\u00eb tij ndaj Ukrain\u00ebs dhe kontrollit t\u00eb tij t\u00eb pushtetit n\u00eb vend.<\/span><\/p>\n