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Mes lajmeve t\u00eb agjencive t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs amerikane q\u00eb pretendojn\u00eb se Kina po ndihmon n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb aktive programin e zhvillimit t\u00eb raketave balistike t\u00eb Arabis\u00eb Saudite, ende mungojn\u00eb provat p\u00ebr objektin e zhvillimit t\u00eb raketave t\u00eb Riadit dhe rolin e Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb ngritjen e saj.<\/span><\/p>\n Shum\u00eb po pyesin n\u00ebse ky bashk\u00ebpunim i supozuar sh\u00ebnon nj\u00eb ndryshim n\u00eb angazhimin e Kin\u00ebs me Lindjen e Mesme nga Irani drejt Arabis\u00eb Saudite. \u00cbsht\u00eb gjithashtu e paqart\u00eb n\u00ebse Pekini mund t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb nj\u00eb strategji ekuilibruese ndaj k\u00ebtyre fuqive rajonale.<\/span><\/p>\n Riadi po zhvendoset drejt prodhimit t\u00eb raketave t\u00eb tij balistike p\u00ebr t\u00eb plot\u00ebsuar blerjet e tij n\u00eb tregun nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar t\u00eb arm\u00ebve p\u00ebr tre arsye.<\/span><\/p>\n S\u00eb pari jan\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e tensionuara saudito-amerikane. Ish-presidenti i SHBA-s\u00eb, Donald Trump, e paralajm\u00ebroi mbretin Salman n\u00eb vitin 2018 se sundimi i tij \u2018nuk do zgjasteas \u00a0dy jav\u00eb\u2019 pa mb\u00ebshtetjen e SHBA-s\u00eb. N\u00eb shtator 2021, Shtetet e Bashkuara hoq\u00ebn sistemin e tyre t\u00eb p\u00ebrparuar t\u00eb mbrojtjes raketore dhe baterit\u00eb \u2018Patriot\u2019 nga Arabia Saudite, pavar\u00ebsisht sulmeve nga rebel\u00ebt Houthi t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetur nga Irani.<\/span><\/p>\n Presidenti Joe Biden e qortoi Riadin n\u00eb tetor 2022 p\u00ebr uljen e prodhimit t\u00eb naft\u00ebs nga grupi OPEC+. Uashingtoni ka kund\u00ebrshtuar gjithashtu t\u00eb furnizoj\u00eb me raketa balistike dhe teknologji Riadin p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur ep\u00ebrsin\u00eb ushtarake t\u00eb Izraelit n\u00eb rajon.<\/span><\/p>\n S\u00eb dyti, pavar\u00ebsisht se ka forca t\u00eb armatosura t\u00eb pajisura mir\u00eb, Riadi ka nj\u00eb sistem t\u00eb dob\u00ebt t\u00eb mbrojtjes ajrore, t\u00eb cilin Houthi-t e ekspozuan duke goditur objekte t\u00eb profilit t\u00eb lart\u00eb, si magazinat e naft\u00ebs Aramco n\u00eb mars 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n S\u00eb treti, rivali kryesor rajonal i Arabis\u00eb Saudite, Irani, ka fituar nj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi t\u00eb fuqishme raketore.<\/span><\/p>\n Nga k\u00ebndv\u00ebshtrimi i Arabis\u00eb Saudite, zgjerimi i mund\u00ebsive t\u00eb blerjes s\u00eb arm\u00ebve dhe p\u00ebrvet\u00ebsimi i teknologjis\u00eb s\u00eb raketave balistike \u00ebsht\u00eb i nevojsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb forcuar aft\u00ebsit\u00eb parandaluese, p\u00ebr t\u00eb zvog\u00ebluar var\u00ebsin\u00eb e jashtme dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur barazin\u00eb me Iranin.<\/span><\/p>\n K\u00ebtu Kina b\u00ebhet e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme. Pekini i dor\u00ebzoi p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb raketat e tij DF-3A te mbret\u00ebria saudite n\u00eb vitin 1988. Arabia Saudite e pranoi publikisht zot\u00ebrimin e DF-3A-ve vet\u00ebm n\u00eb vitin 2014 kur nj\u00eb raport lajmesh zbuloi se mbret\u00ebria kishte bler\u00eb dhjet\u00ebra raketa DF-21 nga Pekini n\u00eb vitin 2007.<\/span><\/p>\n Ky bashk\u00ebpunim ushtarak n\u00eb rritje mund t\u00eb duket si Kina po ndryshon besnik\u00ebrin\u00eb midis Arabis\u00eb Saudite dhe Iranit. Por nj\u00eb ndryshim n\u00eb politik\u00ebn ekuilibruese t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs duket i pamundur. Transferimi i teknologjis\u00eb s\u00eb raketave n\u00eb Arabin\u00eb Saudite mbetet n\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me politik\u00ebn e siguris\u00eb energjetike t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs.<\/span><\/p>\n Transferimi i teknologjis\u00eb raketore t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb Riad \u00ebsht\u00eb i izoluar nga zotimi i saj me Teheranin. Nj\u00eb shqyrtim i ngusht\u00eb i politik\u00ebs s\u00eb Kin\u00ebs n\u00eb rajon zbulon se ajo preferon status quo-n\u00eb midis dy vendeve.<\/span><\/p>\n N\u00eb thelb, Pekini mbetet i p\u00ebrkushtuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb shfryt\u00ebzuar aspiratat e Arabis\u00eb Saudite p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjeruar portofolet e saj t\u00eb importeve dhe eksporteve larg vendeve per\u00ebndimore, mes thirrjeve popullore p\u00ebr mb\u00ebshtetje ndaj p\u00ebrpjekjeve t\u00eb mbret\u00ebris\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur \u00e7\u00ebshtjet e brendshme.<\/span><\/p>\n Por asgj\u00eb nuk sugjeron se kinez\u00ebt po zgjedhin Arabin\u00eb Saudite n\u00eb vend t\u00eb Iranit pasi t\u00eb dyja vendet kan\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn.<\/span><\/p>\n P\u00ebrpjekja e Arabis\u00eb Saudite p\u00ebr t\u00eb ushqyer aleat\u00ebt aziatik\u00eb vjen gjithashtu drejtp\u00ebrdrejt nga k\u00ebrkimi i saj p\u00ebr tregje t\u00eb reja p\u00ebr produktet e saj energjetike. Si shteti m\u00eb i madh prodhues i etur p\u00ebr energji, Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb bler\u00ebsi m\u00eb i madh i energjis\u00eb s\u00eb Riadit.<\/span><\/p>\n Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb partneri m\u00eb i madh tregtar i Arabis\u00eb Saudite dhe klienti i energjis\u00eb me nj\u00eb v\u00ebllim tregtar dypal\u00ebsh prej 87 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00ebsh n\u00eb vitin 2021. Shitja e arm\u00ebve dhe transferimi i teknologjis\u00eb prej 245 milion\u00eb dollar\u00ebsh jan\u00eb copa t\u00eb vogla n\u00eb krahasim.<\/span><\/p>\n Pavar\u00ebsisht k\u00ebsaj, ndihma kineze e teknologjis\u00eb raketore p\u00ebr Arabin\u00eb Saudite nuk do zvog\u00ebloj\u00eb rolin e Iranit si partneri strategjik m\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm i Pekinit n\u00eb rajon. Bashk\u00ebpunimi i Teheranit \u00ebsht\u00eb jetik p\u00ebr suksesin e nism\u00ebs s\u00eb Pekinit \u2018Belt and Road\u2019 (Brez e Rrug\u00eb).<\/span><\/p>\n Vendndodhja e Iranit n\u00eb kryq\u00ebzimin e Azis\u00eb Qendrore, Azis\u00eb Jugore dhe Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme \u00ebsht\u00eb kritike p\u00ebr t\u00eb hyr\u00eb n\u00eb step\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb Azis\u00eb Qendrore q\u00eb Pekini synon t\u00eb konsolidoj\u00eb n\u00eb sfer\u00ebn e tij t\u00eb ndikimit.<\/span><\/p>\n Shum\u00eb iranian\u00eb mund ta shohin blerjen e raketave nga Arabia Saudite si tradhti t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs. Por Teherani njeh preferenc\u00ebn e Pekinit p\u00ebr marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie jo armiq\u00ebsore – n\u00ebse jo miq\u00ebsore – n\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb Gjirin Persik. Komuniteti strategjik i Iranit \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithashtu plot\u00ebsisht i vet\u00ebdijsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr vendndodhjen e tij gjeostrategjike, duke e b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb pamundur lidhjen e tij me Pekinin.<\/span><\/p>\n Angazhimi i Kin\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb investuar mbi 400 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb n\u00eb Iran gjat\u00eb 25 viteve t\u00eb ardhshme \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00ebsimdh\u00ebn\u00ebs. Ideologjia e fort\u00eb anti-per\u00ebndimore e Teheranit dhe mosbesimi ndaj Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara e siguron Pekinin p\u00ebr besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e tij brenda konkurrenc\u00ebs m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe Kin\u00eb-SHBA. Irani do mb\u00ebshtes\u00eb Pekinin n\u00ebse do ribashkonte Tajvanin me Kin\u00ebn kontinentale, gj\u00eb q\u00eb do sillte n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb pashmangshme Shtetet e Bashkuara n\u00eb tablo.<\/span><\/p>\n Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, Riadi mbetet fort n\u00ebn ndikimin e SHBA-s\u00eb, pavar\u00ebsisht \u2018tensioneve\u2019 t\u00eb fundit. Shtetet e Bashkuara madje kan\u00eb pajtuar Arabin\u00eb Saudite dhe Izraelin p\u00ebr programin b\u00ebrthamor t\u00eb Iranit, duke ilustruar m\u00eb tej bashk\u00ebpunimin e ngusht\u00eb t\u00eb siguris\u00eb me Shtetet e Bashkuara. \u00c7do riorganizim me Kin\u00ebn duket i pamundur pasi do n\u00ebnkuptonte braktisjen e ombrell\u00ebs s\u00eb siguris\u00eb s\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n Ky ka qen\u00eb nj\u00eb faktor mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebs n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e jashtme saudite q\u00eb nga marr\u00ebveshja e partneritetit strategjik t\u00eb vitit 1945 me Shtetet e Bashkuara. Do ishte e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb p\u00ebr Riadin t\u00eb z\u00ebvend\u00ebsonte var\u00ebsin\u00eb e tij nga pajisjet ushtarake t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb pasi ripozicionimi do n\u00ebnkuptonte vuajtje t\u00eb forcave t\u00eb tij t\u00eb armatosura p\u00ebr sa u p\u00ebrket furnizimeve t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht p\u00ebr forcat e tij ajrore.<\/span><\/p>\n P\u00ebr sa koh\u00eb q\u00eb Riadi mbetet i varur nga Uashingtoni p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb e tij, miq\u00ebsia e Kin\u00ebs me Riadin n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb Teheranit nuk ka gjasa. R\u00ebnd\u00ebsia strategjike e Arabis\u00eb Saudite p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn gjithashtu zbehet n\u00eb krahasim me Teheranin. Megjith\u00ebse Arabia Saudite \u00ebsht\u00eb furnizuesi m\u00eb i madh i energjis\u00eb i Pekinit, ky \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb zinxhir importi nga i cili Kina synon t\u00eb zgjerohet.<\/span><\/p>\n Ajo q\u00eb mund t\u00eb prish\u00eb aktin ekuilibrues t\u00eb Pekinit midis Arabis\u00eb Saudite dhe Iranit \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb ndryshim i politik\u00ebs s\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb politikave kok\u00ebfort\u00eb t\u00eb mbret\u00ebris\u00eb me OPEC +.<\/span><\/p>\n Perceptimi se Shtetet e Bashkuara po shk\u00ebputeshin dal\u00ebngadal\u00eb nga rajoni \u00ebsht\u00eb i pasakt\u00eb. Uashingtoni angazhohet vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb pak\u00ebsuar angazhimet e tij ushtarake n\u00eb rajon duke u t\u00ebrhequr nga Afganistani, duke mos hequr dor\u00eb p\u00ebr fare nga ep\u00ebrsia e tij rajonale.<\/span><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/11\/ezgif.com-gif-maker-2-2.jpg\")
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