{"id":504874,"date":"2022-02-15T18:17:48","date_gmt":"2022-02-15T17:17:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/?p=504874"},"modified":"2023-06-27T22:38:17","modified_gmt":"2023-06-27T20:38:17","slug":"pse-kriza-e-ukraines-eshte-faji-i-perendimit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/2022\/02\/15\/pse-kriza-e-ukraines-eshte-faji-i-perendimit\/","title":{"rendered":"Pse kriza e Ukrain\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb faji i Per\u00ebndimit","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Nga John J. Mearsheimer*<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Sipas mendimit mbizot\u00ebruese n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim, kriza e Ukrain\u00ebs mund t’i faturohet pothuajse t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht agresionit rus. Presidenti rus Vladimir Putin, vijon argumentimi, aneksoi Krimen\u00eb nga nj\u00eb d\u00ebshir\u00eb e gjat\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb ringjallur perandorin\u00eb sovjetike dhe ai p\u00ebrfundimisht mund t\u00eb shkoj\u00eb pas pjes\u00ebs tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs, si dhe vendeve t\u00eb tjera n\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn Lindore. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb k\u00ebndv\u00ebshtrim, rr\u00ebzimi i presidentit ukrainas Viktor Janukovi\u00e7 n\u00eb shkurt 2014, siguroi thjesht nj\u00eb pretekst p\u00ebr vendimin e Putinit p\u00ebr t\u00eb urdh\u00ebruar forcat ruse t\u00eb pushtonin nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Por kjo llogari \u00ebsht\u00eb e gabuar: Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj evropian\u00eb ndajn\u00eb pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsis\u00eb p\u00ebr kriz\u00ebn. Thelbi i telashit \u00ebsht\u00eb zgjerimi i NATO-s, elementi qendror i nj\u00eb strategjie m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb nxjerr\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn nga orbita e Rusis\u00eb dhe p\u00ebr ta integruar at\u00eb n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim. N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn koh\u00eb, zgjerimi i BE-s\u00eb drejt lindjes dhe mb\u00ebshtetja e Per\u00ebndimit p\u00ebr l\u00ebvizjen pro-demokracis\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb \u2013 duke filluar me Revolucionin Portokalli n\u00eb 2004 \u2013 ishin gjithashtu element\u00eb kritik\u00eb. Q\u00eb nga mesi i viteve 1990, lider\u00ebt rus\u00eb e kan\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtuar me vendosm\u00ebri zgjerimin e NATO-s dhe n\u00eb vitet e fundit, ata e kan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb se nuk do t\u00eb q\u00ebndronin n\u00eb k\u00ebmb\u00eb derisa fqinji i tyre i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm strategjik t\u00eb shnd\u00ebrrohej n\u00eb nj\u00eb bastion per\u00ebndimor. P\u00ebr Putinin, p\u00ebrmbysja e paligjshme e presidentit t\u00eb zgjedhur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb demokratike dhe pro-ruse t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs \u2013 t\u00eb cil\u00ebn ai me t\u00eb drejt\u00eb e etiketoi nj\u00eb \u201cgrusht shteti\u201d \u2013 ishte kashta e fundit. Ai u p\u00ebrgjigj duke marr\u00eb Krimen\u00eb, nj\u00eb gadishull p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin kishte frik\u00eb se do t\u00eb b\u00ebhej nj\u00eb baz\u00eb detare e NATO-s dhe duke punuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb destabilizuar Ukrain\u00ebn derisa ajo t\u00eb braktiste p\u00ebrpjekjet e saj p\u00ebr t’u bashkuar me Per\u00ebndimin.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kund\u00ebrshtimi i Putinit nuk duhet t\u00eb ishte befasi. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, Per\u00ebndimi kishte l\u00ebvizur n\u00eb oborrin e sht\u00ebpis\u00eb s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb dhe po k\u00ebrc\u00ebnonte interesat e saj thelb\u00ebsore strategjike, nj\u00eb pik\u00eb q\u00eb Putin e b\u00ebri n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb prer\u00eb dhe n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebritur. Elitat n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Evrop\u00eb jan\u00eb verbuar nga ngjarjet vet\u00ebm sepse ato pajtohen me nj\u00eb pik\u00ebpamje t\u00eb gabuar t\u00eb politik\u00ebs nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. Ata priren t\u00eb besojn\u00eb se logjika e realizmit ka pak r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi n\u00eb shekullin e nj\u00ebzet e nj\u00eb dhe se Evropa mund t\u00eb mbahet e plot\u00eb dhe e lir\u00eb n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb parimeve liberale t\u00eb tilla si sundimi i ligjit, nd\u00ebrvar\u00ebsia ekonomike dhe demokracia.<\/span><\/p>\n

Por kjo skem\u00eb e madhe shkoi keq n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. Kriza atje tregon se realpolitika mbetet relevante \u2013 dhe shtetet q\u00eb e injorojn\u00eb at\u00eb e b\u00ebjn\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb me rrezikun e tyre. Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit amerikan\u00eb dhe evropian\u00eb gabuan n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjen p\u00ebr ta kthyer Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb nj\u00eb bastion per\u00ebndimor n\u00eb kufirin e Rusis\u00eb. Tani q\u00eb pasojat u zbuluan, do t\u00eb ishte nj\u00eb gabim edhe m\u00eb i madh t\u00eb vazhdohej kjo politik\u00eb e keqmenduar.<\/span><\/p>\n

Fyerja Per\u00ebndimore<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Me p\u00ebrfundimin e Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb, udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit sovjetik\u00eb preferuan q\u00eb forcat amerikane t\u00eb mbesin n\u00eb Evrop\u00eb dhe NATO t\u00eb q\u00ebndroj\u00eb e paprekur, nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje q\u00eb ata mendonin se do ta mbante t\u00eb paq\u00ebsuar nj\u00eb Gjermani t\u00eb ribashkuar. Por ata dhe pasardh\u00ebsit e tyre rus\u00eb nuk donin q\u00eb NATO t\u00eb b\u00ebhej m\u00eb e madhe dhe supozuan se diplomat\u00ebt per\u00ebndimor\u00eb i kuptonin shqet\u00ebsimet e tyre. Administrata e Klintonit me sa duket mendonte ndryshe, dhe n\u00eb mesin e viteve 1990, ajo filloi t\u00eb shtynte NATO-n t\u00eb zgjerohej.<\/span><\/p>\n

Raundi i par\u00eb i zgjerimit u zhvillua n\u00eb 1999 dhe futi Republik\u00ebn \u00c7eke, Hungarin\u00eb dhe Polonin\u00eb. I dyti ndodhi n\u00eb vitin 2004, ai p\u00ebrfshiu Bullgarin\u00eb, Estonin\u00eb, Letonin\u00eb, Lituanin\u00eb, Rumanin\u00eb, Sllovakin\u00eb dhe Sllovenin\u00eb. Moska u ankua me hidh\u00ebrim q\u00eb n\u00eb fillim. P\u00ebr shembull, gjat\u00eb fushat\u00ebs s\u00eb bombardimeve t\u00eb NATO-s kund\u00ebr serb\u00ebve t\u00eb Bosnj\u00ebs n\u00eb vitin 1995, presidenti rus Boris Jelcin tha: \u201cKjo \u00ebsht\u00eb shenja e par\u00eb e asaj q\u00eb mund t\u00eb ndodh\u00eb kur NATO t\u00eb vij\u00eb deri n\u00eb kufijt\u00eb e Federat\u00ebs Ruse. \u2026 Flaka e luft\u00ebs mund t\u00eb shp\u00ebrthej\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn<\/em>.\u201d Por rus\u00ebt ishin shum\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebt n\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb penguar zgjerimin e NATO-s drejt lindjes \u2013 e cila, n\u00eb \u00e7do rast, nuk dukej aq k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuese, pasi asnj\u00eb nga an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e rinj nuk ndante nj\u00eb kufi me Rusin\u00eb, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 vendeve t\u00eb vogla baltike.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pastaj NATO filloi t\u00eb shikonte m\u00eb n\u00eb lindje. N\u00eb samitin e saj t\u00eb prillit 2008 n\u00eb Bukuresht, aleanca konsideroi pranimin e Gjeorgjis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs. Administrata e Xhorxh W. Bush e mb\u00ebshteti k\u00ebt\u00eb, por Franca dhe Gjermania e kund\u00ebrshtuan mas\u00ebn nga frika se kjo do t\u00eb antagonizonte n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb padrejt\u00eb Rusin\u00eb. N\u00eb fund, an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e NATO-s arrit\u00ebn nj\u00eb kompromis: aleanca nuk e filloi procesin formal q\u00eb \u00e7on n\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebsim, por ajo l\u00ebshoi nj\u00eb deklarat\u00eb duke miratuar aspiratat e Gjeorgjis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs dhe duke deklaruar me guxim: “K\u00ebto vende do t\u00eb b\u00ebhen an\u00ebtar\u00eb t\u00eb NATO-s”.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moska, megjithat\u00eb, nuk e pa rezultatin si nj\u00eb kompromis. Alexander Grushko, n\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb z\u00ebvend\u00ebsminist\u00ebr i Jasht\u00ebm i Rusis\u00eb, tha: “An\u00ebtar\u00ebsimi i Gjeorgjis\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb aleanc\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb gabim i madh strategjik q\u00eb do t\u00eb kishte pasoja m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnda p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb pan-evropiane<\/em>“. Putin pohoi se pranimi i k\u00ebtyre dy vendeve n\u00eb NATO do t\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsonte nj\u00eb “k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb” p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb. Nj\u00eb gazet\u00eb ruse raportoi se Putini, nd\u00ebrsa fliste me Bushin, “me shum\u00eb transparenc\u00eb la t\u00eb kuptohet se n\u00ebse Ukraina do t\u00eb pranohej n\u00eb NATO, ajo do t\u00eb pushonte s\u00eb ekzistuari”.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pushtimi rus i Gjeorgjis\u00eb n\u00eb gusht 2008 duhet t\u00eb kishte shp\u00ebrndar\u00eb \u00e7do dyshim t\u00eb mbetur n\u00eb lidhje me vendosm\u00ebrin\u00eb e Putinit p\u00ebr t\u00eb penguar Gjeorgjin\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebn q\u00eb t’i bashkohen NATO-s. Presidenti gjeorgjian Mikheil Saakashvili, i cili ishte thell\u00ebsisht i p\u00ebrkushtuar p\u00ebr ta futur vendin e tij n\u00eb NATO, kishte vendosur n\u00eb ver\u00ebn e vitit 2008 t\u00eb ribashkonte dy rajone separatiste, Abkhazin\u00eb dhe Osetin\u00eb e Jugut. Por Putin u p\u00ebrpoq ta mbante Gjeorgjin\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebt dhe t\u00eb ndar\u00eb \u2013 dhe jasht\u00eb NATO-s. Pasi shp\u00ebrthyen luftimet midis qeveris\u00eb gjeorgjiane dhe separatist\u00ebve t\u00eb Osetis\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut, forcat ruse mor\u00ebn kontrollin e Abkhazis\u00eb dhe Osetis\u00eb s\u00eb Jugut. Moska e kishte shprehur mendimin e saj. Megjithat\u00eb, pavar\u00ebsisht k\u00ebtij paralajm\u00ebrimi t\u00eb qart\u00eb, NATO kurr\u00eb nuk e braktisi publikisht q\u00ebllimin e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb futur Gjeorgjin\u00eb dhe Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb aleanc\u00eb. Dhe zgjerimi i NATO-s vazhdoi t\u00eb marshonte p\u00ebrpara, me Shqip\u00ebrin\u00eb dhe Kroacin\u00eb q\u00eb u b\u00ebn\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00eb n\u00eb 2009.<\/span><\/p>\n

BE, gjithashtu, ka marshuar drejt lindjes. N\u00eb maj 2008, ajo shpalosi nism\u00ebn e saj t\u00eb Partneritetit Lindor, nj\u00eb program p\u00ebr t\u00eb nxitur prosperitetin n\u00eb vende t\u00eb tilla si Ukraina dhe p\u00ebr t’i integruar ato n\u00eb ekonomin\u00eb e BE-s\u00eb. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebr t’u habitur q\u00eb udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit rus\u00eb e shohin planin si armiq\u00ebsor ndaj interesave t\u00eb vendit t\u00eb tyre. Shkurtin e kaluar, p\u00ebrpara se Yanukovych t\u00eb largohej nga detyra, ministri i Jasht\u00ebm rus Sergey Lavrov akuzoi BE-n\u00eb se po p\u00ebrpiqej t\u00eb krijonte nj\u00eb “sfer\u00eb ndikimi” n\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn Lindore. N\u00eb syt\u00eb e lider\u00ebve rus\u00eb, zgjerimi i BE-s\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb kal\u00eb p\u00ebrndjek\u00ebs p\u00ebr zgjerimin e NATO-s.<\/span><\/p>\n

Mjeti i fundit i Per\u00ebndimit p\u00ebr t\u00eb larguar Kievin nga Moska ka qen\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekja p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrhapur vlerat per\u00ebndimore dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb promovuar demokracin\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb dhe shtete t\u00eb tjera post-sovjetike, nj\u00eb plan q\u00eb shpesh p\u00ebrfshin financimin e individ\u00ebve dhe organizatave proper\u00ebndimore. Victoria Nuland, ndihm\u00ebs sekretarja e shtetit p\u00ebr \u00e7\u00ebshtjet evropiane dhe euroaziatike, vler\u00ebsoi n\u00eb dhjetor 2013 se Shtetet e Bashkuara kishin investuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 5 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00eb q\u00eb nga viti 1991 p\u00ebr t\u00eb ndihmuar Ukrain\u00ebn t\u00eb arrij\u00eb “t\u00eb ardhmen q\u00eb meriton”. Si pjes\u00eb e k\u00ebsaj p\u00ebrpjekjeje, qeveria e SHBA ka financuar Fondacionin Komb\u00ebtar p\u00ebr Demokraci. Fondacioni jofitimprur\u00ebs ka financuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 60 projekte q\u00eb synojn\u00eb promovimin e shoq\u00ebris\u00eb civile n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, dhe presidenti i NED, Carl Gershman, e ka quajtur at\u00eb vend “\u00e7mimin m\u00eb t\u00eb madh”. Pasi Yanukovych fitoi zgjedhjet presidenciale t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb shkurt 2010, NED vendosi se ai po minonte q\u00ebllimet e saj dhe k\u00ebshtu rriti p\u00ebrpjekjet e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetur opozit\u00ebn dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb forcuar institucionet demokratike t\u00eb vendit.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kur udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit rus\u00eb shikojn\u00eb inxhinierin\u00eb sociale per\u00ebndimore n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, ata shqet\u00ebsohen se vendi i tyre mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb i radh\u00ebs. Dhe frika t\u00eb tilla v\u00ebshtir\u00eb se jan\u00eb t\u00eb pabaza. N\u00eb shtator 2013, Gershman shkroi n\u00eb The Washington Post, “Zgjedhja e Ukrain\u00ebs p\u00ebr t’u bashkuar me Evrop\u00ebn do t\u00eb p\u00ebrshpejtoj\u00eb r\u00ebnien e ideologjis\u00eb s\u00eb imperializmit rus q\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson Putini<\/em>“. Ai shtoi: \u201cRus\u00ebt gjithashtu p\u00ebrballen me nj\u00eb zgjedhje dhe Putini mund ta gjej\u00eb veten n\u00eb nj\u00eb fund t\u00eb humbur jo vet\u00ebm n\u00eb af\u00ebrsi t\u00eb jashtme, por edhe brenda vet\u00eb Rusis\u00eb<\/em>\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

Krijimi i nj\u00eb krize<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Paketa e trefisht\u00eb e politikave t\u00eb Per\u00ebndimit \u2013 zgjerimi i NATO-s, zgjerimi i BE-s\u00eb dhe promovimi i demokracis\u00eb \u2013 i hodh\u00ebn benzin\u00eb zjarrit q\u00eb priste t\u00eb ndizej. Shk\u00ebndija erdhi n\u00eb n\u00ebntor 2013, kur Yanukovych hodhi posht\u00eb nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje t\u00eb madhe ekonomike q\u00eb kishte negociuar me BE-n\u00eb dhe vendosi t\u00eb pranonte nj\u00eb kund\u00ebrofert\u00eb ruse prej 15 miliard\u00eb dollar\u00ebsh. Ky vendim shkaktoi demonstrata antiqeveritare q\u00eb u p\u00ebrshkall\u00ebzuan gjat\u00eb tre muajve n\u00eb vijim dhe q\u00eb nga mesi i shkurtit kishin \u00e7uar n\u00eb vdekjen e rreth nj\u00ebqind protestuesve. Emisar\u00ebt per\u00ebndimor\u00eb fluturuan me nxitim n\u00eb Kiev p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur kriz\u00ebn. M\u00eb 21 shkurt, qeveria dhe opozita arrit\u00ebn nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje q\u00eb i lejoi Yanukovych t\u00eb q\u00ebndronte n\u00eb pushtet deri n\u00eb mbajtjen e zgjedhjeve t\u00eb reja. Por ajo u shp\u00ebrb\u00eb menj\u00ebher\u00eb dhe Yanukovych iku n\u00eb Rusi t\u00eb nes\u00ebrmen. Qeveria e re n\u00eb Kiev ishte pro-per\u00ebndimore dhe anti-ruse deri n\u00eb palc\u00eb, dhe p\u00ebrmbante kat\u00ebr an\u00ebtar\u00eb t\u00eb rangut t\u00eb lart\u00eb, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb legjitime mund t\u00eb etiketoheshin neofashist\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edhe pse shtrirja e plot\u00eb e p\u00ebrfshirjes s\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb nuk ka dal\u00eb ende n\u00eb drit\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se Uashingtoni e mb\u00ebshteti grushtin e shtetit. Nuland dhe senatori republikan John McCain mor\u00ebn pjes\u00eb n\u00eb demonstratat antiqeveritare dhe Geoffrey Pyatt, ambasadori i SHBA n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, deklaroi pas p\u00ebrmbysjes s\u00eb Yanukovych se ishte “nj\u00eb dit\u00eb p\u00ebr librat e historis\u00eb”. Si\u00e7 zbuloi nj\u00eb regjistrim telefonik i publikuar, Nuland kishte mbrojtur ndryshimin e regjimit dhe donte q\u00eb politikani ukrainas Arseniy Yatsenyuk t\u00eb b\u00ebhej kryeminist\u00ebr n\u00eb qeverin\u00eb e re, gj\u00eb q\u00eb ndodhi m\u00eb pas. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb \u00e7udi q\u00eb rus\u00ebt e t\u00eb gjitha bindjeve t\u00eb mendojn\u00eb se Per\u00ebndimi luajti nj\u00eb rol n\u00eb rr\u00ebzimin e Yanukovych.<\/span><\/p>\n

P\u00ebr Putinin, kishte ardhur koha p\u00ebr t\u00eb vepruar kund\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebs dhe Per\u00ebndimit. Menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas 22 shkurtit, ai urdh\u00ebroi forcat ruse t\u00eb merrnin Krimen\u00eb nga Ukraina dhe menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas k\u00ebsaj, ai e p\u00ebrfshiu at\u00eb n\u00eb Rusi. Detyra u tregua relativisht e leht\u00eb, fal\u00eb mij\u00ebra trupave ruse t\u00eb stacionuara tashm\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb baz\u00eb detare n\u00eb portin e Krimes\u00eb t\u00eb Sevastopolit. Krimea u b\u00eb gjithashtu nj\u00eb objektiv i leht\u00eb pasi rus\u00ebt etnik\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb af\u00ebrsisht 60 p\u00ebr qind t\u00eb popullsis\u00eb s\u00eb saj. Shumica prej tyre donin t\u00eb largoheshin nga Ukraina.<\/span><\/p>\n

M\u00eb pas, Putini ushtroi presion masiv mbi qeverin\u00eb e re n\u00eb Kiev p\u00ebr ta dekurajuar at\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb anonte me Per\u00ebndimin kund\u00ebr Mosk\u00ebs, duke e b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb se ai do ta shkat\u00ebrronte Ukrain\u00ebn si nj\u00eb shtet funksional p\u00ebrpara se ta lejonte at\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebhej nj\u00eb bastion per\u00ebndimor n\u00eb pragun e Rusis\u00eb. P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb q\u00ebllim, ai ka ofruar k\u00ebshilltar\u00eb, arm\u00eb dhe mb\u00ebshtetje diplomatike p\u00ebr separatist\u00ebt rus\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn lindore, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt po e shtyjn\u00eb vendin drejt luft\u00ebs civile. Ai ka grumbulluar nj\u00eb ushtri t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb kufirin ukrainas, duke k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuar se do t\u00eb pushtoj\u00eb n\u00ebse qeveria godet rebel\u00ebt. Dhe ai ka rritur ndjesh\u00ebm \u00e7mimin e gazit natyror q\u00eb Rusia i shet Ukrain\u00ebs dhe ka k\u00ebrkuar pages\u00ebn p\u00ebr eksportet e kaluara. Putini \u00ebsht\u00eb duke luajtur loj\u00ebra t\u00eb forta.<\/span><\/p>\n

Diagnoza<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Veprimet e Putinit duhet t\u00eb jen\u00eb t\u00eb lehta p\u00ebr t’u kuptuar. Nj\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb e madhe toke e shesht\u00eb q\u00eb Franca Napoleonike, Gjermania Perandorake dhe Gjermania Naziste kaluan t\u00eb gjitha p\u00ebr t\u00eb goditur vet\u00eb Rusin\u00eb, Ukraina sh\u00ebrben si nj\u00eb shtet tampon me r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi t\u00eb madhe strategjike p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb. Asnj\u00eb lider rus nuk do t\u00eb toleronte nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb ushtarake q\u00eb ishte armiku i vdeksh\u00ebm i Mosk\u00ebs deri von\u00eb, duke u zhvendosur n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. As ndonj\u00eb lider rus nuk do t\u00eb q\u00ebndronte duarkryq nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb Per\u00ebndimi ndihmoi n\u00eb instalimin e nj\u00eb qeverie q\u00eb ishte e vendosur t\u00eb integronte Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim.<\/span><\/p>\n

Uashingtonit mund t\u00eb mos i p\u00eblqej\u00eb pozicioni i Mosk\u00ebs, por duhet t\u00eb kuptoj\u00eb logjik\u00ebn q\u00eb q\u00ebndron pas tij. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb Gjeopolitika 101: fuqit\u00eb e m\u00ebdha jan\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb t\u00eb ndjeshme ndaj k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve t\u00eb mundshme pran\u00eb territorit t\u00eb tyre. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, Shtetet e Bashkuara nuk tolerojn\u00eb fuqit\u00eb e m\u00ebdha t\u00eb larg\u00ebta q\u00eb t\u00eb vendosin forca ushtarake kudo n\u00eb hemisfer\u00ebn per\u00ebndimore, aq m\u00eb pak n\u00eb kufijt\u00eb e saj. Imagjinoni zem\u00ebrimin n\u00eb Uashington n\u00ebse Kina do t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtonte nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb mbres\u00ebl\u00ebn\u00ebse ushtarake dhe do t\u00eb p\u00ebrpiqej t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshinte Kanadan\u00eb dhe Meksik\u00ebn n\u00eb t\u00eb. lider\u00ebt rus\u00eb u kan\u00eb th\u00ebn\u00eb homolog\u00ebve t\u00eb tyre per\u00ebndimor\u00eb n\u00eb shum\u00eb raste se ata e konsiderojn\u00eb t\u00eb papranuesh\u00ebm zgjerimin e NATO-s n\u00eb Gjeorgji dhe Ukrain\u00eb, s\u00eb bashku me \u00e7do p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t’i kthyer ato vende kund\u00ebr Rusis\u00eb \u2013 nj\u00eb mesazh q\u00eb lufta ruso-gjeorgjiane e vitit 2008 e b\u00ebri gjithashtu t\u00eb qart\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Zyrtar\u00ebt nga Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj evropian\u00eb pohojn\u00eb se ata u p\u00ebrpoq\u00ebn shum\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb zbutur frik\u00ebn ruse dhe se Moska duhet t\u00eb kuptoj\u00eb se NATO nuk ka plane p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb. P\u00ebrve\u00e7 mohimit t\u00eb vazhduesh\u00ebm se zgjerimi i saj kishte p\u00ebr q\u00ebllim frenimin e Rusis\u00eb, aleanca nuk ka vendosur kurr\u00eb forca ushtarake n\u00eb shtetet e saj t\u00eb reja an\u00ebtare. N\u00eb vitin 2002, ajo madje krijoi nj\u00eb organ t\u00eb quajtur K\u00ebshilli NATO-Rusi n\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje p\u00ebr t\u00eb nxitur bashk\u00ebpunimin. P\u00ebr t\u00eb zbutur m\u00eb tej Rusin\u00eb, Shtetet e Bashkuara njoftuan n\u00eb vitin 2009 se do t\u00eb vendosin sistemin e tyre t\u00eb ri t\u00eb mbrojtjes raketore n\u00eb anijet luftarake n\u00eb uj\u00ebrat evropiane, t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn fillimisht, n\u00eb vend t\u00eb territorit \u00e7ek apo polak. Por asnj\u00eb nga k\u00ebto masa nuk funksionoi; rus\u00ebt mbet\u00ebn kund\u00ebr zgjerimit t\u00eb NATO-s, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht n\u00eb Gjeorgji dhe Ukrain\u00eb. Dhe jan\u00eb rus\u00ebt, jo Per\u00ebndimi, ata q\u00eb n\u00eb fund duhet t\u00eb vendosin se \u00e7far\u00eb konsiderohet si k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim p\u00ebr ta.<\/span><\/p>\n

P\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar pse Per\u00ebndimi, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht Shtetet e Bashkuara, nuk arrit\u00ebn t\u00eb kuptonin se politika e saj n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb po krijonte bazat p\u00ebr nj\u00eb p\u00ebrplasje t\u00eb madhe me Rusin\u00eb, duhet t\u00eb kthehemi n\u00eb mesin e viteve 1990, kur administrata e Klintonit filloi t\u00eb mb\u00ebshteste zgjerimin e NATO-s. Ekspert\u00ebt parashtruan nj\u00eb s\u00ebr\u00eb argumentesh pro dhe kund\u00ebr zgjerimit, por nuk kishte konsensus se \u00e7far\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebhej. Shumica e emigrant\u00ebve t\u00eb Evrop\u00ebs Lindore n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe t\u00eb af\u00ebrmit e tyre, p\u00ebr shembull, e mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebn fuqimisht zgjerimin, sepse donin q\u00eb NATO t\u00eb mbronte vende t\u00eb tilla si Hungaria dhe Polonia. Disa realist\u00eb gjithashtu favorizuan politik\u00ebn, sepse ata mendonin se Rusia ende duhej t\u00eb frenohej.<\/span><\/p>\n

Por shumica e realist\u00ebve kund\u00ebrshtuan zgjerimin, me besimin se nj\u00eb fuqi e madhe n\u00eb r\u00ebnie me nj\u00eb popullsi n\u00eb plakje dhe nj\u00eb ekonomi nj\u00ebdimensionale n\u00eb fakt nuk kishte nevoj\u00eb t\u00eb frenohej. Dhe ata kishin frik\u00eb se zgjerimi do t’i jepte Mosk\u00ebs vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb nxitje p\u00ebr t\u00eb shkaktuar telashe n\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn Lindore. Diplomati amerikan George Kennan e artikuloi k\u00ebt\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb intervist\u00eb t\u00eb vitit 1998, menj\u00ebher\u00eb pasi Senati i SHBA miratoi raundin e par\u00eb t\u00eb zgjerimit t\u00eb NATO-s. “Un\u00eb mendoj se rus\u00ebt gradualisht do t\u00eb reagojn\u00eb mjaft negativisht dhe kjo do t\u00eb ndikoj\u00eb n\u00eb politikat e tyre,”<\/em> tha ai. \u201cMendoj se \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb gabim tragjik. Nuk kishte asnj\u00eb arsye p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb. Askush nuk po k\u00ebrc\u00ebnonte ask\u00ebnd tjet\u00ebr<\/em>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Shumica e liberal\u00ebve, nga ana tjet\u00ebr, favorizuan zgjerimin, duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb shum\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00eb ky\u00e7 t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb Klintonit. Ata besonin se fundi i Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb kishte transformuar rr\u00ebnj\u00ebsisht politik\u00ebn nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare dhe se nj\u00eb rend i ri postkomb\u00ebtar kishte z\u00ebvend\u00ebsuar logjik\u00ebn realiste q\u00eb dikur drejtonte Evrop\u00ebn. Shtetet e Bashkuara nuk ishin vet\u00ebm “kombi i domosdosh\u00ebm”, si\u00e7 tha Sekretarja e Shtetit Madeleine Albright; ishte gjithashtu nj\u00eb hegjemon beninj dhe k\u00ebshtu nuk kishte gjasa t\u00eb shihej si nj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb. Q\u00ebllimi, n\u00eb thelb, ishte q\u00eb i gjith\u00eb kontinenti t\u00eb dukej si Evrop\u00ebn Per\u00ebndimore.<\/span><\/p>\n

Dhe k\u00ebshtu, Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e tyre u p\u00ebrpoq\u00ebn t\u00eb promovonin demokracin\u00eb n\u00eb vendet e Evrop\u00ebs Lindore, t\u00eb rrisnin nd\u00ebrvar\u00ebsin\u00eb ekonomike midis tyre dhe t’i ngulitnin ato n\u00eb institucionet nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. Pasi fituan debatin n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara, liberal\u00ebt kishin pak v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi p\u00ebr t\u00eb bindur aleat\u00ebt e tyre evropian\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetur zgjerimin e NATO-s. N\u00eb fund t\u00eb fundit, duke pasur parasysh arritjet e kaluara t\u00eb BE-s\u00eb, evropian\u00ebt ishin edhe m\u00eb t\u00eb martuar se amerikan\u00ebt me iden\u00eb se gjeopolitika nuk kishte m\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi dhe se nj\u00eb rend liberal gjith\u00ebp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebs mund t\u00eb ruante paqen n\u00eb Evrop\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Aq t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht liberal\u00ebt arrit\u00ebn t\u00eb dominojn\u00eb diskursin p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb evropiane gjat\u00eb dekad\u00ebs s\u00eb par\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebtij shekulli, saq\u00eb edhe pse aleanca miratoi nj\u00eb politik\u00eb t\u00eb dyerve t\u00eb hapura t\u00eb zmadhimit, zgjerimi i NATO-s u p\u00ebrball me pak kund\u00ebrshtime realiste. Bot\u00ebkuptimi liberal tashm\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb dogm\u00eb e pranuar n\u00eb mesin e zyrtar\u00ebve amerikan\u00eb. N\u00eb mars, p\u00ebr shembull, Presidenti Barack Obama mbajti nj\u00eb fjalim p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin ai foli vazhdimisht p\u00ebr “idealet” q\u00eb motivojn\u00eb politik\u00ebn per\u00ebndimore dhe se si ato ideale “jan\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuar shpesh nga nj\u00eb pik\u00ebpamje m\u00eb e vjet\u00ebr, m\u00eb tradicionale e pushtetit”. P\u00ebrgjigja e Sekretarit t\u00eb Shtetit John Kerry ndaj kriz\u00ebs s\u00eb Krimes\u00eb pasqyroi t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn perspektiv\u00eb: “Ju thjesht nuk silleni n\u00eb shekullin e nj\u00ebzet e nj\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00ebn e shekullit t\u00eb n\u00ebnt\u00ebmb\u00ebdhjet\u00eb duke pushtuar nj\u00eb vend tjet\u00ebr me pretekst krejt\u00ebsisht t\u00eb sajuar”.<\/span><\/p>\n

N\u00eb thelb, t\u00eb dy pal\u00ebt kan\u00eb vepruar me libra t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm loj\u00ebrash: Putini dhe bashkatdhetar\u00ebt e tij kan\u00eb menduar dhe vepruar sipas diktateve realiste, nd\u00ebrsa homolog\u00ebt e tyre per\u00ebndimor\u00eb u jan\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajtur ideve liberale p\u00ebr politik\u00ebn nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. Rezultati \u00ebsht\u00eb se Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e tyre provokuan pa e ditur nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb t\u00eb madhe mbi Ukrain\u00ebn.<\/span><\/p>\n

Loja e fajit<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn intervist\u00eb t\u00eb vitit 1998, Kennan parashikoi se zgjerimi i NATO-s do t\u00eb provokonte nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb, pas s\u00eb cil\u00ebs ithtar\u00ebt e zgjerimit do t\u00eb “thonin se ne gjithmon\u00eb ju kemi th\u00ebn\u00eb se k\u00ebshtu jan\u00eb rus\u00ebt”. Si t\u00eb thuash, shumica e zyrtar\u00ebve per\u00ebndimor\u00eb e kan\u00eb portretizuar Putinin si fajtorin e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb n\u00eb situat\u00ebn e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. N\u00eb mars, sipas The New York Times, kancelarja gjermane Angela Merkel la t\u00eb kuptohej se Putin ishte irracional, duke i th\u00ebn\u00eb Obam\u00ebs se ai ishte “n\u00eb nj\u00eb bot\u00eb tjet\u00ebr”. Megjith\u00ebse Putini pa dyshim ka prirje autokratike, asnj\u00eb prov\u00eb nuk e mb\u00ebshtet akuz\u00ebn se ai \u00ebsht\u00eb i \u00e7ekuilibruar mend\u00ebrisht. P\u00ebrkundrazi: ai \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb strateg i klasit t\u00eb par\u00eb q\u00eb duhet t\u00eb ket\u00eb frik\u00eb dhe respekt nga kushdo q\u00eb e sfidon n\u00eb politik\u00ebn e jashtme.<\/span><\/p>\n

Analist\u00eb t\u00eb tjer\u00eb pretendojn\u00eb, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb besueshme, se Putinit i vjen keq p\u00ebr r\u00ebnien e Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe \u00ebsht\u00eb i vendosur ta ndryshoj\u00eb at\u00eb duke zgjeruar kufijt\u00eb e Rusis\u00eb. Sipas k\u00ebtij interpretimi, Putini, pasi ka marr\u00eb Krimen\u00eb, tani po teston uj\u00ebrat p\u00ebr t\u00eb par\u00eb n\u00ebse \u00ebsht\u00eb koha e duhur p\u00ebr t\u00eb pushtuar Ukrain\u00ebn, ose t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn pjes\u00ebn lindore t\u00eb saj, dhe ai p\u00ebrfundimisht do t\u00eb sillet n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb agresive ndaj vendeve t\u00eb tjera n\u00eb fqinj\u00ebsin\u00eb e Rusis\u00eb. P\u00ebr disa n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kamp, Putini p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb Adolf Hitler t\u00eb dit\u00ebve t\u00eb sotme dhe arritja e \u00e7do lloj marr\u00ebveshjeje me t\u00eb do t\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebriste gabimin e Mynihut. K\u00ebshtu, NATO duhet t\u00eb pranoj\u00eb q\u00eb Gjeorgjia dhe Ukraina t\u00eb frenojn\u00eb Rusin\u00eb p\u00ebrpara se ajo t\u00eb dominoj\u00eb fqinj\u00ebt e saj dhe t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnoj\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn Per\u00ebndimore.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ky argument d\u00ebshton pas inspektimit nga af\u00ebr. N\u00ebse Putini do t\u00eb ishte i p\u00ebrkushtuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb Rusi m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe, shenjat e synimeve t\u00eb tij pothuajse me siguri do t\u00eb kishin dal\u00eb p\u00ebrpara 22 shkurtit. Por praktikisht nuk ka asnj\u00eb prov\u00eb se ai ishte i vendosur t\u00eb merrte Krimen\u00eb, aq m\u00eb pak ndonj\u00eb territor tjet\u00ebr n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, p\u00ebrpara k\u00ebsaj date. Edhe lider\u00ebt per\u00ebndimor\u00eb q\u00eb mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebn zgjerimin e NATO-s nuk po e b\u00ebnin k\u00ebt\u00eb nga frika se Rusia do t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorte forc\u00ebn ushtarake. Veprimet e Putinit n\u00eb Krime i befasuan plot\u00ebsisht dhe duket se kan\u00eb qen\u00eb nj\u00eb reagim spontan ndaj rr\u00ebzimit t\u00eb Yanukovych. Menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas k\u00ebsaj, edhe Putin tha se ai kund\u00ebrshtoi shk\u00ebputjen e Krimes\u00eb, p\u00ebrpara se t\u00eb ndryshonte shpejt mendjen.<\/span><\/p>\n

P\u00ebrve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, edhe sikur t\u00eb donte, Rusis\u00eb i mungon aft\u00ebsia p\u00ebr t\u00eb pushtuar dhe aneksuar leht\u00ebsisht Ukrain\u00ebn lindore, aq m\u00eb pak t\u00eb gjith\u00eb vendin. Af\u00ebrsisht 15 milion\u00eb njer\u00ebz – nj\u00eb e treta e popullsis\u00eb s\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs – jetojn\u00eb midis lumit Dnieper, i cili cop\u00ebton vendin, dhe kufirit rus. Nj\u00eb shumic\u00eb d\u00ebrrmuese e atyre njer\u00ebzve duan t\u00eb mbeten pjes\u00eb e Ukrain\u00ebs dhe me siguri do t’i rezistonin nj\u00eb pushtimi rus. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, ushtria mediok\u00ebr e Rusis\u00eb, e cila tregon pak shenja t\u00eb shnd\u00ebrrimit n\u00eb nj\u00eb Wehrmacht modern, do t\u00eb kishte pak shanse p\u00ebr t\u00eb qet\u00ebsuar t\u00eb gjith\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn. Moska \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithashtu e pozicionuar keq p\u00ebr t\u00eb paguar p\u00ebr nj\u00eb profesion t\u00eb kushtuesh\u00ebm; ekonomia e saj e dob\u00ebt do t\u00eb vuante edhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebrball\u00eb sanksioneve q\u00eb rezultojn\u00eb.<\/span><\/p>\n

Por edhe n\u00ebse Rusia do t\u00eb mburrej me nj\u00eb makin\u00eb t\u00eb fuqishme ushtarake dhe nj\u00eb ekonomi mbres\u00ebl\u00ebn\u00ebse, ajo p\u00ebrs\u00ebri ndoshta do t\u00eb ishte e paaft\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb pushtuar me sukses Ukrain\u00ebn. Mjafton t\u00eb merret parasysh p\u00ebrvoja sovjetike dhe e SHBA-s\u00eb n\u00eb Afganistan, p\u00ebrvoja e SHBA-s\u00eb n\u00eb Vietnam dhe Irak dhe p\u00ebrvoja ruse n\u00eb \u00c7e\u00e7eni p\u00ebr t’u kujtuar se pushtimet ushtarake zakonisht p\u00ebrfundojn\u00eb keq. Putini me siguri e kupton se p\u00ebrpjekja p\u00ebr t\u00eb n\u00ebnshtruar Ukrain\u00ebn do t\u00eb ishte nj\u00ebsoj si t\u00eb g\u00eblltiste nj\u00eb porcupine. P\u00ebrgjigja e tij ndaj ngjarjeve atje ka qen\u00eb mbrojt\u00ebse, jo ofenduese.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb rrug\u00ebdalje<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Duke pasur parasysh se shumica e lider\u00ebve per\u00ebndimor\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb t\u00eb mohojn\u00eb se sjellja e Putinit mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb e motivuar nga shqet\u00ebsime legjitime t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebr t’u habitur q\u00eb ata jan\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekur ta modifikojn\u00eb at\u00eb duke dyfishuar politikat e tyre ekzistuese dhe kan\u00eb nd\u00ebshkuar Rusin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb penguar agresionin e m\u00ebtejsh\u00ebm. Megjith\u00ebse Kerry ka pohuar se “t\u00eb gjitha opsionet jan\u00eb n\u00eb tryez\u00eb”, as Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe as aleat\u00ebt e saj n\u00eb NATO nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrgatitur t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorin forc\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur Ukrain\u00ebn. Per\u00ebndimi po mb\u00ebshtetet n\u00eb sanksionet ekonomike p\u00ebr t\u00eb detyruar Rusin\u00eb q\u00eb t’i jap\u00eb fund mb\u00ebshtetjes s\u00eb saj p\u00ebr kryengritjen n\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn lindore. N\u00eb korrik, Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe BE vendos\u00ebn raundin e tret\u00eb t\u00eb sanksioneve t\u00eb kufizuara, duke synuar kryesisht individ\u00eb t\u00eb nivelit t\u00eb lart\u00eb t\u00eb lidhur ngusht\u00eb me qeverin\u00eb ruse dhe disa banka t\u00eb profilit t\u00eb lart\u00eb, kompani energjetike dhe firma mbrojtjeje. Ata gjithashtu k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuan se do t\u00eb nd\u00ebshojn\u00eb nj\u00eb raund tjet\u00ebr, m\u00eb t\u00eb ashp\u00ebr sanksionesh, q\u00eb synojn\u00eb sektor\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb ekonomis\u00eb ruse.<\/span><\/p>\n

Masa t\u00eb tilla do t\u00eb ken\u00eb pak efekt. Gjithsesi, sanksionet e ashpra ka t\u00eb ngjar\u00eb t\u00eb dalin nga tavolina; Vendet e Evrop\u00ebs Per\u00ebndimore, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht Gjermania, i kan\u00eb rezistuar imponimit t\u00eb tyre nga frika se Rusia mund t\u00eb hakmerret dhe t\u00eb shkaktoj\u00eb d\u00ebme serioze ekonomike brenda BE-s\u00eb. Por edhe n\u00ebse Shtetet e Bashkuara mund t\u00eb bindin aleat\u00ebt e saj q\u00eb t\u00eb marrin masa t\u00eb ashpra, Putini ndoshta nuk do ta ndryshonte vendimmarrjen e tij. Historia tregon se vendet do t\u00eb thithin sasi t\u00eb m\u00ebdha nd\u00ebshkimesh p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur interesat e tyre strategjike thelb\u00ebsore. Nuk ka asnj\u00eb arsye p\u00ebr t\u00eb menduar se Rusia p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb p\u00ebrjashtim nga ky rregull.<\/span><\/p>\n

Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit per\u00ebndimor\u00eb jan\u00eb kapur gjithashtu pas politikave provokuese q\u00eb p\u00ebrshpejtuan kriz\u00ebn n\u00eb radh\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb. N\u00eb prill, n\u00ebnpresidenti i SHBA-s\u00eb Joseph Biden u takua me ligjv\u00ebn\u00ebsit ukrainas dhe u tha atyre: “Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb mund\u00ebsi e dyt\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrmbushur premtimin origjinal t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nga Revolucioni Portokalli”. John Brennan, drejtori i CIA-s, nuk i ndihmoi gj\u00ebrat kur, po at\u00eb muaj, ai vizitoi Kievin n\u00eb nj\u00eb udh\u00ebtim q\u00eb Sht\u00ebpia e Bardh\u00eb tha se kishte p\u00ebr q\u00ebllim p\u00ebrmir\u00ebsimin e bashk\u00ebpunimit t\u00eb siguris\u00eb me qeverin\u00eb ukrainase.<\/span><\/p>\n

BE, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb, ka vazhduar t\u00eb shtyj\u00eb Partneritetin e saj Lindor. N\u00eb mars, Jos\u00e9 Manuel Barroso, presidenti i Komisionit Evropian, p\u00ebrmblodhi t\u00eb menduarit e BE-s\u00eb p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn, duke th\u00ebn\u00eb: \u201cNe kemi nj\u00eb borxh, nj\u00eb detyr\u00eb solidariteti me at\u00eb vend dhe do t\u00eb punojm\u00eb q\u00eb t’i kemi sa m\u00eb af\u00ebr nesh<\/em>.\u201d Dhe me siguri, m\u00eb 27 qershor, BE dhe Ukraina n\u00ebnshkruan marr\u00ebveshjen ekonomike q\u00eb Yanukovych e kishte refuzuar me fat shtat\u00eb muaj m\u00eb par\u00eb. Gjithashtu n\u00eb qershor, n\u00eb nj\u00eb takim t\u00eb ministrave t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm t\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb NATO-s, u ra dakord q\u00eb aleanca t\u00eb mbetet e hapur p\u00ebr an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e rinj, megjith\u00ebse ministrat e jasht\u00ebm nuk e p\u00ebrmend\u00ebn Ukrain\u00ebn me em\u00ebr. \u201cAsnj\u00eb vend i tret\u00eb nuk ka t\u00eb drejt\u00ebn e vetos mbi zgjerimin e NATO-s\u201d, tha Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Sekretari i P\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i NATO-s. Ministrat e jasht\u00ebm ran\u00eb dakord gjithashtu t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesin masa t\u00eb ndryshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrmir\u00ebsuar aft\u00ebsit\u00eb ushtarake t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb fusha t\u00eb tilla si komanda dhe kontrolli, logjistika dhe mbrojtja kibernetike. Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit rus\u00eb natyrsh\u00ebm jan\u00eb zmbrapsur nga k\u00ebto veprime; P\u00ebrgjigja e Per\u00ebndimit ndaj kriz\u00ebs vet\u00ebm sa do ta p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsoj\u00eb nj\u00eb situat\u00eb t\u00eb keqe.<\/span><\/p>\n

Megjithat\u00eb, ekziston nj\u00eb zgjidhje p\u00ebr kriz\u00ebn n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb\u2014ndon\u00ebse do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkonte q\u00eb Per\u00ebndimi t\u00eb mendonte p\u00ebr vendin n\u00eb nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb thelb\u00ebsisht t\u00eb re. Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj duhet t\u00eb heqin dor\u00eb nga plani i tyre p\u00ebr per\u00ebndimorizimin e Ukrain\u00ebs dhe n\u00eb vend t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj t\u00eb synojn\u00eb ta b\u00ebjn\u00eb at\u00eb nj\u00eb tampon neutral midis NATO-s dhe Rusis\u00eb, t\u00eb ngjashme me pozicionin e Austris\u00eb gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb. Udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit per\u00ebndimor\u00eb duhet t\u00eb pranojn\u00eb se Ukraina ka aq shum\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi p\u00ebr Putinin, saq\u00eb ata nuk mund t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesin nj\u00eb regjim anti-rus atje. Kjo nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se nj\u00eb qeveri e ardhshme ukrainase do t\u00eb duhej t\u00eb ishte pro-ruse ose anti-NATO. P\u00ebrkundrazi, synimi duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb nj\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb sovrane q\u00eb nuk bie as n\u00eb kampin rus dhe as n\u00eb at\u00eb per\u00ebndimor.<\/span><\/p>\n

P\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur k\u00ebt\u00eb q\u00ebllim, Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrjashtojn\u00eb publikisht zgjerimin e NATO-s si n\u00eb Gjeorgji ashtu edhe n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. Per\u00ebndimi duhet t\u00eb ndihmoj\u00eb gjithashtu n\u00eb krijimin e nj\u00eb plani shp\u00ebtimi ekonomik p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn, t\u00eb financuar bashk\u00ebrisht nga BE, Fondi Monetar Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar, Rusia dhe Shtetet e Bashkuara – nj\u00eb propozim q\u00eb Moska duhet ta mir\u00ebpres\u00eb, duke pasur parasysh interesin e saj p\u00ebr t\u00eb pasur nj\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb t\u00eb begat\u00eb dhe t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme n\u00eb krahun per\u00ebndimor t\u00eb saj. Dhe Per\u00ebndimi duhet t\u00eb kufizoj\u00eb ndjesh\u00ebm p\u00ebrpjekjet e tij inxhinierike sociale brenda Ukrain\u00ebs. \u00cbsht\u00eb koha p\u00ebr t’i dh\u00ebn\u00eb fund mb\u00ebshtetjes per\u00ebndimore p\u00ebr nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr Revolucion Portokalli. Megjithat\u00eb, udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsit e SHBA-s\u00eb dhe Evrop\u00ebs duhet t\u00eb inkurajojn\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn q\u00eb t\u00eb respektoj\u00eb t\u00eb drejtat e pakicave, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht t\u00eb drejtat gjuh\u00ebsore t\u00eb rusisht-fol\u00ebsve t\u00eb saj.<\/span><\/p>\n

Disa mund t\u00eb argumentojn\u00eb se ndryshimi i politik\u00ebs ndaj Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb dat\u00eb t\u00eb von\u00eb do t\u00eb d\u00ebmtonte seriozisht besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e SHBA-s\u00eb n\u00eb mbar\u00eb bot\u00ebn. Padyshim q\u00eb do t\u00eb kishte kosto t\u00eb caktuara, por kostot e vazhdimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb strategjie t\u00eb gabuar do t\u00eb ishin shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, vendet e tjera ka t\u00eb ngjar\u00eb t\u00eb respektojn\u00eb nj\u00eb shtet q\u00eb m\u00ebson nga gabimet e tij dhe p\u00ebrfundimisht harton nj\u00eb politik\u00eb q\u00eb trajton n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb efektive problemin n\u00eb fjal\u00eb. Ky opsion \u00ebsht\u00eb qart\u00ebsisht i hapur p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara.<\/span><\/p>\n

Artikulohet gjithashtu pretendimi se Ukraina ka t\u00eb drejt\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktoj\u00eb se me k\u00eb d\u00ebshiron t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb dhe rus\u00ebt nuk kan\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb ta pengojn\u00eb Kievin t\u00eb bashkohet me Per\u00ebndimin. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb e rrezikshme p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn q\u00eb t\u00eb mendoj\u00eb p\u00ebr zgjedhjet e saj t\u00eb politik\u00ebs s\u00eb jashtme. E v\u00ebrteta e trishtueshme \u00ebsht\u00eb se shpeshher\u00eb mund t\u00eb korrigjohet kur n\u00eb loj\u00eb jan\u00eb politikat e fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha. T\u00eb drejtat abstrakte si vet\u00ebvendosja jan\u00eb kryesisht t\u00eb pakuptimta kur shtetet e fuqishme hyjn\u00eb n\u00eb z\u00ebnka me shtete m\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebta. A kishte Kuba t\u00eb drejt\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb ushtarake me Bashkimin Sovjetik gjat\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb? Shtetet e Bashkuara sigurisht q\u00eb nuk menduan k\u00ebshtu, dhe rus\u00ebt mendojn\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebr bashkimin e Ukrain\u00ebs me Per\u00ebndimin. \u00cbsht\u00eb n\u00eb interesin e Ukrain\u00ebs q\u00eb t\u00eb kuptoj\u00eb k\u00ebto fakte t\u00eb jet\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb ec\u00eb me kujdes kur ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me fqinjin e saj m\u00eb t\u00eb fuqish\u00ebm.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edhe n\u00ebse dikush e refuzon k\u00ebt\u00eb analiz\u00eb, megjithat\u00eb, dhe beson se Ukraina ka t\u00eb drejt\u00ebn e peticionit p\u00ebr t’u bashkuar me BE-n\u00eb dhe NATO-n, fakti mbetet se Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj evropian\u00eb kan\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb t’i refuzojn\u00eb k\u00ebto k\u00ebrkesa. Nuk ka asnj\u00eb arsye q\u00eb Per\u00ebndimi duhet t\u00eb akomodoj\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00ebse ajo \u00ebsht\u00eb e vendosur t\u00eb ndjek\u00eb nj\u00eb politik\u00eb t\u00eb jashtme t\u00eb gabuar, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht n\u00ebse mbrojtja e saj nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb interes jetik. K\u00ebnaqja e \u00ebndrrave t\u00eb disa ukrainasve nuk ia vlen armiq\u00ebsia dhe grindja q\u00eb do t\u00eb shkaktoj\u00eb, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht p\u00ebr popullin ukrainas.<\/span><\/p>\n

Natyrisht, disa analist\u00eb mund t\u00eb pranojn\u00eb se NATO i trajtoi keq marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Ukrain\u00ebn dhe megjithat\u00eb ende pohojn\u00eb se Rusia p\u00ebrb\u00ebn nj\u00eb armik q\u00eb vet\u00ebm do t\u00eb b\u00ebhet m\u00eb i friksh\u00ebm me kalimin e koh\u00ebs\u2014dhe se Per\u00ebndimi nuk ka zgjidhje tjet\u00ebr ve\u00e7se t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb politik\u00ebn e tij aktuale. Por kjo pik\u00ebpamje \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb e gabuar. Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb fuqi n\u00eb r\u00ebnie dhe do t\u00eb dob\u00ebsohet me kalimin e koh\u00ebs. Edhe n\u00ebse Rusia do t\u00eb ishte nj\u00eb fuqi n\u00eb rritje, p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, nuk do t\u00eb kishte kuptim t\u00eb inkorporonte Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb NATO. Arsyeja \u00ebsht\u00eb e thjesht\u00eb: Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e tyre evropian\u00eb nuk e konsiderojn\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn si nj\u00eb interes thelb\u00ebsor strategjik, si\u00e7 ka d\u00ebshmuar mosgatishm\u00ebria e tyre p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorur forc\u00ebn ushtarake p\u00ebr t’i ardhur n\u00eb ndihm\u00eb. Prandaj, do t\u00eb ishte kulmi i marr\u00ebzis\u00eb t\u00eb krijohej nj\u00eb an\u00ebtar i ri i NATO-s, t\u00eb cilin an\u00ebtar\u00ebt e tjer\u00eb nuk kan\u00eb nd\u00ebrmend ta mbrojn\u00eb. NATO \u00ebsht\u00eb zgjeruar n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn, sepse liberal\u00ebt supozuan se aleanca nuk do t\u00eb duhej t\u00eb respektonte kurr\u00eb garancit\u00eb e saj t\u00eb reja t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, por loja e fundit e pushtetit t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb tregon se dh\u00ebnia e an\u00ebtar\u00ebsimit t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb NATO mund ta vendos\u00eb Rusin\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimin n\u00eb nj\u00eb kurs p\u00ebrplasjeje.<\/span><\/p>\n

Q\u00ebndrimi n\u00eb politik\u00ebn aktuale do t\u00eb nd\u00ebrlikonte gjithashtu marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet per\u00ebndimore me Mosk\u00ebn p\u00ebr \u00e7\u00ebshtje t\u00eb tjera. Shtetet e Bashkuara kan\u00eb nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr ndihm\u00ebn e Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr pajisjet amerikane nga Afganistani p\u00ebrmes territorit rus, p\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje b\u00ebrthamore me Iranin dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb stabilizuar situat\u00ebn n\u00eb Siri. N\u00eb fakt, Moska e ka ndihmuar Uashingtonin p\u00ebr t\u00eb tre k\u00ebto \u00e7\u00ebshtje n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn; n\u00eb ver\u00ebn e vitit 2013, ishte Putin ai q\u00eb nxori g\u00ebshtenjat e Obam\u00ebs nga zjarri duke falsifikuar marr\u00ebveshjen sipas s\u00eb cil\u00ebs Siria pranoi t\u00eb hiqte dor\u00eb nga arm\u00ebt e saj kimike, duke shmangur k\u00ebshtu sulmin ushtarak t\u00eb SHBA-s\u00eb q\u00eb Obama kishte k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuar. Shtetet e Bashkuara gjithashtu do t\u00eb ken\u00eb nevoj\u00eb nj\u00eb dit\u00eb p\u00ebr ndihm\u00ebn e Rusis\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb kontrolluar nj\u00eb Kin\u00eb n\u00eb rritje. Megjithat\u00eb, politika aktuale e SHBA-s\u00eb vet\u00ebm sa po i afron Mosk\u00ebn dhe Pekinin.<\/span><\/p>\n

Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e tyre evropian\u00eb tani p\u00ebrballen me nj\u00eb zgjedhje p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn. Ata mund t\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb politik\u00ebn e tyre aktuale, e cila do t\u00eb p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsoj\u00eb armiq\u00ebsit\u00eb me Rusin\u00eb dhe do t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrroj\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb proces – nj\u00eb skenar n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin t\u00eb gjith\u00eb do t\u00eb dilnin humb\u00ebs. Ose mund t\u00eb nd\u00ebrrojn\u00eb ingranazhet dhe t\u00eb punojn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb krijuar nj\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb t\u00eb begat\u00eb, por neutrale, e cila nuk k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon Rusin\u00eb dhe lejon Per\u00ebndimin t\u00eb riparoj\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet e tij me Mosk\u00ebn. Me k\u00ebt\u00eb qasje, t\u00eb gjitha pal\u00ebt do t\u00eb fitonin.<\/span><\/p>\n

VINI RE:<\/strong> <\/span>Artikulli \u00ebsht\u00eb prone intelektuale e Foreign Affairs<\/strong><\/span><\/a> shkruar n\u00eb Shtator\/Tetor 2014.<\/span><\/p>\n

* John J. Mearsheimer\u00a0 \u00ebsht\u00eb Profesor i Shkencave Politike n\u00eb Universitetin e \u00c7ikagos.<\/span><\/p>\n

P\u00ebrshtati p\u00ebr\u00a0Hashtag.al: <\/strong><\/em>Klaudio Agolli.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nga John J. Mearsheimer* Sipas mendimit mbizot\u00ebruese n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim, kriza e Ukrain\u00ebs mund t’i faturohet pothuajse t\u00ebr\u00ebsisht agresionit rus. Presidenti rus Vladimir Putin, vijon argumentimi, aneksoi Krimen\u00eb nga nj\u00eb d\u00ebshir\u00eb e gjat\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb ringjallur perandorin\u00eb sovjetike dhe ai p\u00ebrfundimisht mund t\u00eb shkoj\u00eb pas pjes\u00ebs tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs, si dhe vendeve t\u00eb tjera n\u00eb Evrop\u00ebn […]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":32,"featured_media":504876,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-504874","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-editorial","category-te-fundit"],"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"link","format":"url"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/504874","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/32"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=504874"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/504874\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/504876"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=504874"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=504874"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hashtag.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=504874"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}