By Eduard Halimi
When I heard a few days ago that a team of Italian-Greek lawyers was being hired to draft the urgent intervention of Article 242, it seemed like an interesting idea to me. When you have a big problem on your doorstep (and the problem is no small one because no one in the government is signing anymore), you expect the best professors to solve it.
The week started with two pieces of news from the justice system.
First news: The Supreme Court distributed a lecture by its President that raised one of the most serious problems of the system: (perhaps in the Top 5) pretrial detention.
It was realistic, convincing, professional. I hope every judge reads it. But to solve this serious problem in the mentality of the lower courts, a lecture is not enough. The Supreme Court has the opportunity to issue a Unifying Decision and the case will be taken immediately. But I liked the article, to be honest.
Second news: the government with its ad hoc initiative for article 242 of the CPC which they would do with the "Italian-Greek team". I expected them to be at the presentation. In fact, only Ulsiu appeared. Not that Ulsiu does not have the necessary experience and training. He has been and remains for me a good lawyer and professional prosecutor. (I will not enter into the assessment as a politician or minister because I would be in a conflict of interest and not at all objective)
But I was waiting with interest for the connection of the emergency governmental problem with these Western countries. In fact, the only thing that connects this ad hoc initiative with Italy and Greece are two articles: Article 96 of the Italian Constitution and Article 86 of the Greek Constitution. (See photo b/attached). Both speak of the total protection of ministers from criminal investigation with prior parliamentary authorization. Neither speaks of protection from judicial suspension. It is useless to look for it in the German, French Constitutions or in the Codes of Criminal Procedure of these countries. It does not exist.
Suspension there (but also in our 20-year history) is a political act whenever a cabinet member is suspected of serious criminal offenses. The Prime Minister takes it. The “problem” we have is that our Prime Minister has rejected this political act three times as he declared at the beginning of the week. And not only will he not do it willingly, (I don’t know what he would do with the more severe measure that SPAK is requesting) but he seeks to oppose the suspension by law, creating an illusion for the ministers that they will not be affected by the prosecution, so let them sign. The problem is that the Constitution does not have this protection. And not only that: 4 judges of the Constitutional Court have clearly told him that a constitutional, not a legal, change is needed (see the summary of the underlined decision).
Both news items above lead to criticism of the justice system, the first more lenient towards pre-trial detention as one of the Top 5 problems today and the second more aggressive towards Spak checks on New Year's Eve, the abuse of the republic's power by prosecutors and a list of Orwellian animals that come and go.
Constitutional context in Albania, February 2026
The immunity of ministers and MPs is regulated by Article 73 of the Constitution (amended in 2012). After that amendment, immunity is exhaustive: protection from arrest without parliamentary authorization, but no mention of protection from criminal prosecution or suspension of office by the courts.
The Constitutional Court's summary decision makes it clear: four judges said "if you want protection from suspension, you have to change the Constitution." One of them was an expert drafter of the 2012 reform contracted by PACA (KiE. He knows well: immunity is regulated as exhaustible.
But the news is Article 242 of the CPC where the government seeks to prohibit SPAK/GJKKO from suspending ministers/PMs etc. if they are accused of serious criminal offenses (i.e. corruption) and the public discussion in the constitutional context is the efficiency and possibility of achieving the government's goal.
The hierarchy of norms and the illusion surrounding Article 242
The Constitution is the highest hierarchical norm in our Republic. The Code of Criminal Procedure cannot create a new immunity that the Constitution does not recognize. If Article 242 aims to prohibit the suspension of a minister as a security measure, while the Constitution does not recognize such immunity, then we have a clash between ordinary law and the constitutional norm. In a state of law, in the event of a clash between ordinary law and the Constitution, the constitutional norm prevails and every court is obliged to implement it or may eventually request incidental control in the Constitutional Court where the 4 judges above await it. I do not believe that a legal intervention that creates new procedural expectations for the members of the Constitutional Court will change their previous reasoning (see the expansion of the circle of beneficiary entities from the ad hoc government draft). Since the same reasoning applies to them too: Every privilege must be clearly written in the Constitution and being protected by Article 242 of the CPC is an illusion.
Our justice and the Eastern European basin, the classic model
The debate about Article 242 has nothing to do with Italy, France or Germany. This debate is the pattern that is repeated in Eastern Europe: justice is called “independent, strong, European model” when it hits the opposition or former rulers. As soon as it touches the current government ministers, mayors, directors, courtiers, it immediately becomes “problematic”, “crazy”, “deep state”. Then “urgent reforms” come to curb it.
It is a fact that Spak is doing a good job in the fight against criminal organizations, the dismantling of SkyEncrochat, international criminal cooperation, high corruption in some sectors, without excluding weaknesses or criticisms about investigations or failures.
But Albania is following the same classic cliché we've seen around us:
1. In Romania, after the DNA indicted dozens of ministers, about 50 MPs and hundreds of mayors, Liviu Dragnea (Prime Minister) openly attacked the judiciary in 2017 with the OUG 13 decree, trying to decriminalize corruption and limit the DNA: the judiciary was called "crazy" as soon as it started to hit the government.
2. In Poland, after the indictment of more than 62 senior PiS officials, the PiS government of Mateusz Morawiecki attacked the judicial system between 2020-2023 with legal packages that controlled the Supreme Court and created disciplinary chambers; the judiciary was labeled “politicized by the opposition” as soon as it came to power.
3. In Slovakia, when the Special Prosecutor's Office indicted over 130 people connected to the government administration and indicted the prime minister and defense minister themselves. Robert Fico in 2023 sought to abolish the Special Prosecutor's Office and reduce sentences for corruption: justice became "externally controlled" when it began to crack down on government allies.
4. In Serbia, where President Aleksandar Vučić has strong control over institutions, the Special Prosecution for Organized Crime has launched investigations against several senior ministers (including a current minister and two former ministers) in 2025-2026. The government's response has been immediate: on January 30, 2026, judicial reforms were adopted that weaken the organized criminal prosecution and strengthen political control over the judiciary, again the same classic model.
5. In Albania, 40 out of 61 mayors have active files in SPAK, dozens of ministers, former ministers and MPs, high-ranking officials, have also been convicted or are under investigation and the government has opened a battle after the start of the investigations and the request for the arrest of the deputy prime minister accompanied by 16.000 pages of documents. This is the classic cycle: justice is "European and extraordinary" until it affects the government, then emergency packages come and it is done as described at the beginning of the week by the government.
The consequences in these countries and the civic and international reaction?
You can easily read them on Google or ask ChatGPT or GROK but I don't want to stop here today.
The real problem of justice in 2026.
The Magistrates' School was established in 1997 and I was one of the first to get involved, supporting it until 2-3 years ago. Until 2002, there were no separate profiles, judge/prosecutor. It was a great thing that profiling was created. This is because judges and prosecutors have completely different mindsets and the separation should be made from the very beginning, in training.
I have many friends and colleagues from both profiles. I have respect for many of the regular prosecutors and those from SPAK, men and women who face the difficult work and increasing pressure from crime and related entities every day.
But I say this from my 30-year experience: there have been, are and will be prosecutors who are “enemies” of the government. And this is normal. The government has tenders, has money, has permits, has room for corruption (not the opposition) and undoubtedly the role of the prosecutor is to fight against them. There have been, are and will be operations, campaigns against crime and corruption by prosecutors (perhaps even deviant or delusional). This is not the real problem.
The real problem is not that we have prosecutors in Tirana and in the districts who want to be like SPAK and are delusional, but that we have subservient courts that sign whatever the prosecutor brings to them, that don't even read the pages of the request but only the enacting clause and accept it. The problem is that we have judges who get the decision via USB from the prosecutor.
The real problem we have, then, is: the real separation of the prosecution from the court. This is the problem both for the first news, the concern of the President of the Supreme Court about detentions as the first solution, but also for the second news, the "problem" of the government. Because neither the first nor the second is appointed by the prosecutor. The court appoints it. And in cases where the court decides what the prosecutor requests or becomes the prosecutor's notary, this creates a problem.
And this happens, because it is widely believed that judges are wiretapped by Spak prosecutors, by SHISH or even by district prosecutors. And this is suspected to have happened in the Supreme Court in the strange vote for members of the GJK, where the judge barely won against no one who surprisingly received votes perhaps thanks to this blackmail. But this is suspected to happen in the Constitutional Court as well, and in every court whenever a prosecutor whispers to the judge, perhaps even speculating, that he has "some info" from the wiretaps of the services (including SHISH).
Here, then, justice is failing, even though there are still a few courageous judges who stand up to blackmail or speculation with wiretapping.
The real problem we have is that we have stripped judges of their immunity and they are easily eavesdropped on and blackmailed.
And yes, there is a clear solution to stop this slide: the real separation of the prosecution from the court and the return of a functional, limited and balanced immunity for the judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the GJKKO.
Not absolute immunity, but protection from uncontrolled wiretapping by prosecutors. Because a blackmailed judge is an existential threat to the parliamentary republic. The debate is not about personal privileges, or the inviolability of judges, but about constitutional balance.
Today, a judge of the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court can be wiretapped, detained or investigated by the same prosecutor who is a party to the proceedings before him, without special filters. This creates a real inequality of arms and a climate of fear that endangers freedom of decision-making. The independence of a judge is not a personal privilege, it is not a request to become inviolable, but a constitutional guarantee for the citizen who is judged by him. We must accept a simple truth: a judge who can be wiretapped by the party he is judging is not free. And without a free judge, there is no rule of law for the citizen.
Corruption in the judiciary exists and is undoubtedly on the rise. Justice is not efficient, as DW rightly wrote a week ago. But wiretapping and blackmail do not reduce corruption, but institutionalize it. And this requires serious constitutional reform, not ad hoc fixes.
I know that it takes strong political will, 93 votes. I know that today it seems impossible. But one day, it must be done. When it is done, the big problem will be solved. Until then, we will continue to wander in the constitutional labyrinths, deluded by the illusion of happiness of article 242 that some are more equal than others before the law.
The country does not need illusions of immunity around Article 242, but rather to solve some of the 242 problems that justice has today. It needs to look to Western Europe for a European justice system in form and substance.
And for this, Parliament has a role, because the judiciary does not have the strength to resist without strong social and international support.
